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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the concept of using international arbitration as a method of resolving patent
disputes. First, this paper examines the arbitrability of patent validity disputes from a public policy
viewpoint. The question is whether, or to what extent, the subject matter of patent validity disputes
may be settled by international commercial arbitration. Second, this paper provides suggestions on
strategies for organizational decision makers to consider whether it is proper to choose arbitration as
a more favorable tool when confronted with a patent dispute. Finally, this paper discusses how to
choose the seat of arbitral institution and the applicable law.
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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OF PATENT DISPUTES
WEI-HUA WU*

INTRODUCTION

The number of international intellectual property disputes has increased rapidly
in recent years.1 Patent disputes are usually cross-border and thus involve multiplenations. 2
Domestic patent litigation is exhausting, 3 and international patent
disputes add to this burden. What is more, the current methods to protect and
enforce patent rights have been insufficient in the United States and many other
countries. 4
The commercial value of a business is increased substantially by intellectual
property assets, especially patents. 5 In the United States, the claimed damages by
patent infringement over the last decade amounted to 1.5 billion U.S. dollars; around
sixty percent of claimants were awarded more than one million dollars in every case. 6
Patent disputes can be a life or death matter for an enterprise. This means that
regardless of whether one wins or loses, patent disputes are vital. Resorting to
patent litigation may, however, lead to a frustrating process and high costs,
particularly in the United States. 7 In fact, patent litigation is expensive and
frequently lasts for more than ten years.8 Many cases cost two to five million U.S.
dollars to litigate. 9

* C Wei-hua Wu 2011. Senior Judge, Taiwan Miaoli District Court (2001-); Fulbright Visiting
Scholar, U.S. Department of State (2010-2011); Senior Visiting Scholar at UC Berkeley (20102011); PhD in Law & LLM, National Chengchi University, Taiwan; LLM, The John Marshall Law
School, Chicago. The author sincerely thanks Professor Richard Gruner of The John Marshall Law
School for his excellent teaching and guidance. Heartfelt thanks to anonymous reviewers and
editors of this paper for their invaluable suggestions. However, the author takes full responsibility
for every word of this paper. The author owes many thanks to Alan Zulanas, JD/LLM, The John
Marshall Law School, for his constant kind support.
1 See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a
New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 280 (1991).
2 Bryan Niblett, Arbitrating the CREATIVE, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 64, 66 (1995) (noting that
intellectual property disputes have an international aspect to them due to the intangible nature of
the property).
3See Murray Lee Eiland, The Institutional Role in Arbitrating Patent Disputes, 9 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 283, 283 (2009).
4 Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of
Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 466 (1994).
5Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of patent Valuation Methods with
Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potential for Future Research 1 (Judge Institute of
Management Studies, Working Paper No. WP 21/97, 1997).
6 See Eiland, supra note 3, at 283; Carl G. Love, The Risk/Reward Factors of U.S. Patents,
FINDLAW.COM (Jan. 1996), http://library.findlaw.com/1996/Jan/1/128053.html.
SA patent case could last for twenty-five years. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
140 F.3d. 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that the case was filed in 1973).
8 See, e.g., id.; see Love, supra note 6.
9See Eiland, supra note 3, at 283-84.
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Although U.S. litigation is costly, obstacles from foreign sovereignties make
international claims much more difficult than domestic claims.10
In fact,
international patent lawsuits are full of uncertainty because the parties may not be
familiar with the rules of foreign jurisdictions. Thus, countries suffering from
frequent patent infringement or other intellectual property piracy have developed
many effective dispute resolution mechanisms, including international commercial
arbitration under The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and The
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") framework, to protect internal
markets 11 . WIPO settlement procedures from GATT and Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") 12 are patterned after AAA International
Arbitration Rules 1 3. Seventy-nine out of 102 members of GATT were developing
countries by 1991.14 After the Uruguay Round of TRIPS negotiations, developing
countries were more willing to settle intellectual property disputes under the frame
of WIPO rather than GATT. 15 WIPO's Arbitration Rules provide the best mechanism
to address long-standing, complicated and professional international patent
disputes. 16
International commercial arbitration is a nongovernmental dispute resolution
process based on party autonomy. 17 In general, international arbitration is better
than international litigation, 18 particularly in resolving international intellectual
property disputes. 19

10 Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the North American Free Trade
Agreement: A Successful Case of Regional Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 817, 82021 (1993).
11Bal Gopal Das, Intellectual Property Dispute, GATT, WIPO: Of Playing by the Game Rules &
Rules of the Game, 35 IDEA 149, 174-75 (1994); Harvey J. Winter, The Role of the United States
Government in Improving InternationalIntellectual Property Protection, 27 J.L. & TECH. 325, 32526 (1987).
12Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 121, 122 (1994).
13Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, Geneva, Switzerland,
Mar. 3-4, 1994, Managing an International Arbitration: An Arbitrator's View, WIPO

Publication No. 728

(by

Hans

Smit),

available

at

http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/

conferences/1994/smit.html.
14
Robert E. Hudec, Panel Two: GATT and the Developing Countries, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 67, 71 (1992).
15 See Mitsuo Matsushita, Panel Three: A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights
and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 82 (1992).
16

Id.

17 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution Proliferation, Fragmentation,
and Decentralizationof Dispute Settlement in InternationalTrade, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273,
320-21 (2006).
18 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Introduction: The Elements of Procedure: Are They Separately
Portable?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 649, 653-55 (1997); Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition
and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89, 91-94 (1995); Hans
Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?, 25
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 11 n.3 (1986). See generally Saul Perloff, The Ties that Bind: The
Limits of Autonomy and Uniformity in International Commercial Arbitration, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus.
L. 323 (1992) (providing an overview of international commercial arbitration).
19 See Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, Geneva,
Switzerland, Mar. 3-4, 1994, Opening Address, WIPO Publication No. 728 (by Arpad Bogsch),
available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/1994/opening.html.
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Under common law, commercial arbitration traces back to at least the
fourteenth century. 20 Parties chose arbitration to resolve commercial disputes in
civil law countries, too. 21 During the mid-nineteenth century, parties could foresee
future disputes at the time they entered into their contracts, and they would prepare
arbitration clauses, including the rules and procedures agreed to by the parties
themselves, in advance of any disputes. 22
Modern commercial arbitration is
supposed to be an objective, friendly and conclusive way to settle commercial
disputes. 23
Because of the shortcomings of international patent litigation,
international commercial arbitration has reached a dominant position in patent
disputes in recent years. 24 International commercial arbitration has become "the
preferred method of settling disputes arising out of international commerce." 25 It is
no wonder that in Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 26 the
United States Supreme Court enforced a Swiss arbitration award, noting that
arbitral dispute resolution is consistent with public policy, especially as applied to
international commercial transactions. 27 Arbitration has proven to be a helpful way
to resolve international trade disputes. 28
In fact, the general preference in
international dispute resolution is to utilize arbitration in lieu of litigation.29
This paper discusses the concept of using international arbitration as a method
of resolving patent disputes. First, this paper examines the arbitrability of patent
validity disputes from a public policy viewpoint. 30 The question is whether, or to
what extent, the subject matter of patent validity disputes may be settled by
international commercial arbitration. Second, this paper provides suggestions on
strategies for organizational decision makers to consider whether it is proper to
choose arbitration as a more favorable tool when confronted with a patent dispute. 31
Finally, this paper discusses how to choose the seat of arbitral institution and the
applicable law. 32
20 William Catron Jones, History of Commercial Arbitration in England and the United States:
A Summary View, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION: A ROAD TO WORLD-WIDE COOPERATION
127, 129 (Martin Domke ed., 1958).
21 See, e.g., Henry P. de Vries, InternationalCommercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute
for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42, 48 (1982).
22 Id. at 49.
23 1 GARY B. BORN, Overview of International Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 90, 90 (3d ed. 2009).
24 Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, Geneva, Switzerland,
Mar. 3-4, 1994, Opening Address, WIPO Publication No. 728 (by Arpad Bogsch), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/1994/opening.html.
25 Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, Geneva, Switzerland,
Mar. 3-4, 1994, The Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, WIPO Publication No. 728 (by
Julian
D.M.
Lew),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/
1994/lew.html.
26 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
27 Id. at 638; see Michael F. Hoellering, International Arbitration Under U.S. Law and AAA
Rules, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 25, 28 (1995).
28 See STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5 (1990).
29 Richard J. Graving, The International CommercialArbitration Institutions: How Good a Job
Are They Doing?, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 319, 320 (1989).
30 See discussion, infra Part III.
31 See discussion, infra Part IV.
32 See discussion, infra Part VI.
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I. DEFINITION OF PATENT ARBITRATION

Most modern countries have laws that mandate enforcement of arbitration
awards made by proceedings that satisfy certain requirements. 33 Thus, in these
countries, specific issues that are stipulated in a valid arbitration agreement should
be resolved by arbitration. 34 Arbitrations should be established upon the mutual
consent of the parties. 35 Therefore, arbitration agreements usually are to be in
writing, signed by both parties. 36
A patent arbitration is a commercial arbitration to settle disputes involving
substantive patent law.
For patent disputes that merely concern rights or
obligations derived from contracts such as patent assignment or licensing, the issues
are generally accepted as the proper subject matter of arbitration all around the
world. 37 Thus, this paper does not focus on these types of disputes. Instead, this
paper focuses on arbitration with regard to the validity of patents. This type of
arbitration relates to patent infringement and any defenses the alleged patent
infringer may raise that challenge the validity of the patent. 38 Most likely, these
types of disputes involve a patentee as claimant and an accused infringer as
respondent. In such cases, the accused infringer is eager to avoid or minimize
royalty payments by contending that the patent in question is invalid. 39 The
definition of validity may vary based on country. 40 For example, some jurisdictions
may refer to revocation or enforceability.
In any case, patent validity always
describes the continuing existence or enforceability of patent rights. 41

II. ARBITRAL INSTITUTION AND PROCEDURE

Various institutions around the world have created arbitration rules and
procedures. 42 For example, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law ("UNCITRAL") has Arbitration Rules that are ad hoc. 43
33 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
34 See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 18-19
(5th ed. 2009); Pieter Sanders, Unity and Adoption of the Model Law, 11 ARB. INT'L 1,1 (1995).
35 See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 34, at 18-19.
36U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (1985) (amended 2006)
[hereinafter
UNCITRAL
MODEL
LAW],
available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf; New York Convention, supra note 33, at art. II(1)-(2).

37 See Mark Farley, The Role of Arbitration in the Resolution of Patent Disputes, 3 TOURO L.
REV. 47, 48 (1986).
38See Eiland, supra note 3, at 291.
39E.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 660 (1969); Rhone-Poulenc Specialites Chimiques v.
SCM Corp., 769 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

40M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide, 19
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 304 (2006).
41See id.
42 See, e.g., AUSTL. CENTRE FOR INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION [ACICA], ACICA
ARBITRATION RULES (2005), available at http://acica.org.au/acica-services/acica-arbitration-rules;
SWISS CHAMBERS' COURT OF ARBITRATION & MEDIATION, SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (2006), available at https://www.secam.org/sa/download/SRIA english.pdf.
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Additionally, WIPO has arbitral rules specifically designed for intellectual
property issues. WIPO's rules were based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and
then modified to create a higher degree of confidentiality and to include procedures
specific to intellectual property disputes. 44 Furthermore, the International Chamber
of Commerce ("ICC") is known for its arbitration rules. 45 ICC Rule Article 3 of
Appendix III allows the ICC to be selected as appointed arbitral institution with hoc
act rule. 46
In the U.S., the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") has Arbitration Rules
and Mediation Procedures ("CAR") 47 and the Supplementary Rules for the Resolution
of Patent Disputes ("AAA Supplementary Rules") 48 to deal with patent disputes.
AAA's international branch, International Centre for Dispute Resolution ("ICDR"), 49
also has specific rules-the International Dispute Resolution Procedures ("IDRP").5 0
There are a number of other institutions with arbitration rules across the globe.
The London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA"), for example, was founded in
1892, and has a long history. 51 Its arbitral rules are designed for general cases
instead of patent disputes. 52 Additionally, in the middle-east, the Arab Intellectual
Property Mediation and Arbitration Society was formed in 2003 in Jordan to handle
intellectual property arbitration.5 3 In Asia, China formed an intellectual property
arbitration center in 2007.54 The two are relatively young arbitral institutions.

43 UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL RULES], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf.
44
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. [WIPO], WIPO ARBITRATION RULES, WIPO Publication
No. 446 (2009) [hereinafter WIPO RULES], available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/
en/arbitration/446/wipo-pub_446.pdf.
45 See William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 42 (1996).
46 INT'L CHAMBER

OF COMMERCE

[ICC], RULES OF ARBITRATION,

app. III, art. 3 (1998)

[hereinafter ICC RULES], available at http://www.jus.uio.no/1m/icc.arbitration.rules.1998/doc.html.
47 See Eiland, supra note 3, at 296; AM. ARBITRATION AsS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES
&
MEDIATION
PROCEDURES
(2009)
[hereinafter
CAR
RULES],
available
at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440&printable= true.
48See Eiland, supra note 3, at 296; AM. ARBITRATION AsS'N, RESOLUTION OF PATENT DISPUTES
SUPPLEMENTARY RULES (2006), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=27417.
49 See Eiland, supra note 3, at 296; About the International Centre for Dispute Resolution, Am.
ARBITRATION AsS'N, http://www.adr.org/about-icdr (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
50

AM. ARBITRATION

AsS'N,

INTERNATIONAL

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION

PROCEDURES

(2009)

[hereinafter IDRP], available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994.
51See Eiland, supra note 3, at 295 (discussing the History of the LCIA, LONDON CT. INT'L
ARBITRATION, http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/OurHistory.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2011)).
52See Eiland, supra note 3, at 295; LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION [LCIA], LCIA

ARBITRATION RULES (1998) [hereinafter LCIA RULES], available at http://www.lcia.org/Default.aspx.
53The Arab Center for Mediation and Arbitration in Intellectual Property, ARAB INTELL. PROP.
MEDIATION & ARBITRATION SOC'Y, http://www.aipmas.org/AIPMASJudge.aspx?&1ang en.
54 IP Arbitration Center Set up in Xiarnen as the First of Its Kind in China's Mainland, ST.
INTELL. PROP. OFF. CHINA (Mar. 3, 2007), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipoEnglish/news/iprspecial/

200904/t20090417 452710.html.
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III. THE ARBITRABILITY OF PATENT VALIDITY DISPUTES

A. Where the debates came from
The legal term "arbitrability" refers to whether certain disputes are capable of
resolution by arbitration.55 Many jurisdictions preclude specific subject matter
marital disputes, employment issues, and intellectual property matters-from
arbitration because of public policy. 56 Each jurisdiction may have to consider what
subject matter can or cannot be arbitrated in order to comply with its own economic
and social policy. 5 7 In regard to cross-border disputes, international arbitrations
relate to the balance of competing public policies between the countries involved.5 8
In light of these subject matter limitations, it is unclear as to whether patent
disputes are arbitrable.
Patent rights are generally understood to be a statesanctioned, limited monopoly. 59 Some states often enact statutes to govern how a
"patent monopoly" is granted and to what extent the patent is enforced. 60 When
disputes arise concerning the scope of a patent's monopoly, the state must determine
whether the patent is valid and enforceable. For example, in the United States,
courts determine the validity of a patent when patent invalidity is asserted as a
defense to an infringement claim. 61 In France, a court can also declare a patent
invalid. 62 In Japan, the only authority that can declare a patent invalid is the State
Patent Office, not the courts. 63 In the United States, because patent rights must be
granted exclusively by a competent public authority, 64 some courts have held that
private mechanisms, such as arbitration, cannot declare a patent invalid. 65 This
supports the viewpoint that, in general, the disputes regarding the validity of a
patent should be decided by a public, governmental power instead of a private entity.
Because patents rights are state-sanctioned monopolies, it is the government's
55 See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 34, at 22-23.
56 See W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 87-

90 (3d ed. 2000).
57 Id.
58 See id. at 52-53.
59 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (describing patents
as a limited monopoly in the historical context of the English Crown). See also Liza Vertinsky,
ComparingAlternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV. 501, 512 (2010).
60 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006). Many American legal discussions avoid using the term
"monopoly" because it holds a "monopolization" connotation under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
"A patent is personal property that has some of the aspects of the economist's 'monopoly' but none of
the anticompetitive attributes of the illegal antitrust law 'monopoly."' J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, DESK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 210 (1991).

On the other hand, patent rights have

been treated like a monopoly under the English common law of monopolies. See generally ERNEST
BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, 1 WALKER ON PATENTS 1-67 (3d ed. 1984). Modern European Union law
is much more open to the idea that an intellectual property right may be abused through antitrust

monopolization. See C-241/91 & C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann & Indep. Television Publ'ns. Ltd. v.
Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995).
61 35 U.S.C. §§ 1(a), 2(a) (2006).
62 CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE [C. PRO. INTELL.] art L.613-25 (Fr.).
63 TERUO DoI, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN 33 (1980).
64 35 U.S.C. § 111.

65See Beckman

Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970).
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responsibility to ensure that public policy supports this monopoly by balancing the
needs of the patent holder with the needs of the public. The government is wellpositioned to monitor public policy because the government is neutral and has more
resources to maintain the justice of balancing competing interests. With such an
important focus on public policy, there is doubt as to whether a private entity can
adequately balance these competing interests-even a respected arbitral institution.
Thus, it is understandable where the debates on arbitrability of patent disputes come
from: an arbitration award made by a private arbitral institution may be against
public policy when the dispute concerns the validity of a patent. 66
International attitudes toward the arbitration of issues of patent validity vary
greatly from country to country. The United States is one of the few countries that
recognize arbitration of disputes involving patent validity. 67
International
arbitration agreements may be enforced "even assuming that a contrary result would
be forthcoming in a domestic context" in the United States. 68
Canada and
Switzerland allow patent validity issues to be settled. 69 France and Italy refuse to
allow arbitration of patent validity on the grounds of public policy. 70 In other
countries, patent validity is not arbitrable even though the arbitration award would
be enforceable only as an agreement between the parties. For example, in the
People's Republic of China ("P.R.C."), patent validity arbitration is not permissible71
because it concerns a subject matter of public law. 72 Because many patent disputes
involve the validity of the patent, arbitration of patent disputes is not popular in the
P.R.C. Therefore, the P.R.C. declines to recognize or enforce foreign arbitral awards
regarding patent validity. Instead, disputes that involve the validity of a patent are
handled by the administrative authority and the people's courts in the P.R.C.7 3 In
other countries, positions that discourage arbitration of patent validity prevail
because patent rights are seen as protecting patent owners against any third party
infringement, not just a single party in an isolated patent dispute. If the subject
matter involves a patent validity dispute that cannot be arbitrated, courts refuse to
refer parties to arbitration even when an arbitration agreement exists between the
parties.74
66See Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (1Ith Cir. 1998).
67

35 U.S.C. §§ 135(d), 294.

68Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
69Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, Geneva, Switzerland,

Mar. 3-4, 1994, The Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes with ParticularEmphasis on the
Situation in Switzerland, WIPO Publication No. 728, at 1.10.3.1 (by Robert Briner), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/1994/briner.html.
70 Id. at 2.4, 3.6.
71Zhong Cai Fa (
AU
FQ lt) [Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China]

(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sep. 1, 1995),
art. 3, para. 2 (1995) (China), http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=710.
72See id.; M.A. Smith et al., supra note 40, at 346.
73 Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 3(2).; Min Shi Su Song Fa
( @k
FMUt
[Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by
the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), arts. 217(2), 260(4) (1991) (China),
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db= 1&id= 19.
74 See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 36, at art. 8(1); New York Convention, supra note
33, at art. II(3). As of January 2011, 145 nations have adopted the New York Convention. Status:
1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitration/NYConvention status.html
(last
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Generally speaking, the major patent-exporting countries can be categorized into
two groups in terms of their position on the arbitrability of patent validity. The first
but smaller group respects party autonomy and allows all kinds of patent issues to be
arbitrated. However, the effect of an award regarding the patent validity only exists
between the parties.
The second group prohibits the arbitration of disputes
regarding the patent validity. The second group maintains that arbitral awards
determining the validity of patents will not be binding, and arbitration agreements
relating to patent validity disputes have no effect at all. 75 Only other kinds of patent
disputes, such as those concerning the rights and obligations arising from licensing
agreements, are arbitrable. 76 WIPO's Arbitration and Mediation Center, which
represents the global tendency, has already arbitrated some patent validity disputes,
especially those regarding U.S. and European patents. 77
There are pros and cons to the arbitrability of patent validity. The arguments
are discussed below.

B. The arguments against arbitrability.
Some scholars, who object to the arbitrability of patent disputes, argue that if
laws authorize the courts or competent administrative agencies to decide the validity
of patents, the disputes involving patent validity should be settled exclusively by
these authorities. 78 Arbitration of patent validity, then, would deprive these
authorities of exclusive jurisdiction of determining patent validity. Therefore, any
patent infringement disputes involving patent validity should be excluded from the
resolution by arbitration. 79 The patent right is granted by the sovereign government
so only the state or the designated representative of the state can grant or invalidate
it.80

Another argument against arbitrability is based on the nature of limitation on
arbitrators. This point of view argues that because arbitration is a consensual
process, the effect of it should be confined to the parties participating in the
arbitration voluntarily.8 1 Thus, it is impossible for the arbitration tribunals to
render an award invalidating a patent because the award would affect the public-an
involuntary party. Because an arbitral award is only a private affair, it cannot bind
the third party and any arbitral award attempting to invalidate a patent would

visited Jan. 7, 2011). It is helpful to determine if a country has adopted the New York Convention
as well as to what extent or whether that country tolerates the patent validity issues to be
arbitrated. See Sandra J. Franklin, Information Technology: Arbitrating Technology Cases: Why
ArbitrationMay Be More Effective Than Litigation When Dealing With Technology Issues, 80 MICH.
BAR J. 30, 32 (2001).
7 See, e.g., Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 3(2); Civil Procedure Law of
the People's Republic of China, arts. 217(2), 260(4).
76 M.A. Smith et al., supra note 40, at 305.
77Id. at 304-05.
78 Id. at 306 (citing patent laws in the United States, India, and the Netherlands).
79 E.g., Rijksoctrooiwet [Patent Act], art. 80(2)(a)-(b), Stb. 1995, p. 51 (Neth.).
80 See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 34, at 124.
81 William Grantham, The Arbitrability of International Intellectual Property Disputes, 14
BERKELEY J.JINT'LL. 173, 187 (1996).
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exceed the arbitrator's powers. 82 In addition to this, arguments against arbitrability
of patent validity rely on the separation of public law from private law. 8 3 Since
patent validity falls in the category of the public law, it has no arbitrability.

C. The arguments for arbitrability.
1. With respect to the inter partes effect
The argument for arbitrability suggests that because most patent jurisdictions
around the world allow a patentee to surrender, assign, license or transfer his patent
right to others, 84 the patentee could also exhaust his patent rights in an arbitration
award by choosing arbitration as the conclusive and final solution for his patent
dispute. Where both the arbitrator and the parties have agreed to the result, who
could reject arbitrability? The international tendency is in conformity with this
viewpoint. The ICC arbitration tribunal arbitrated and awarded a patent validity
dispute in 1989.85 In an interim award, the ICC tribunal held that a patent validity
dispute could not be separated from other issues in the same dispute in the
arbitration. 86 The ICC tribunal reasoned that a patent owner had considerable
capacity to assign, waive, or restrict its rights.8 7 In a patent infringement or
invalidity dispute, the patent owner can entirely or partially surrender his rights
against the other party.88 He can also notice his waiver or surrender to Patent
Office. 89 He can sell, donate or transfer all or part of his rights. 90 He can also
provide the patent in part or in its entirety as security or pledge. 91 The patentee can
dispose of his rights to the same extent as that of any other property, which means
that the party in arbitration can assign his rights to the arbitral tribunal. 92 "In
principle, therefore, there is no legal obstacle that bars an Arbitral Tribunal, thus
empowered by the parties, to rule, as a preliminary matter, on the material validity
of a patent".93 Such an award is binding between the parties.94
The arguments against arbitrability often focus on vague references to the public
policy of the patent grant instead of clearly and deliberately defining what exact

82 See Christopher John Aeschlimann, The Arbitrability of Patent Controversies, 44 J. PAT. OFF.
SOCY 655, 662 (1962).

83 See Grantham, supra note 81, at 183.
84 E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006); Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBL. I at 1,
§§ 58, 64 (Ger.).
85 Interim Award in Case No. 6097 of 1989, 4 Int'l Comm. Arb. 76 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.).
For
more discussion, see P. Schlosser, Notwendige Reformen des deutschen Rechts der
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 8 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 492, 499 (1987).
86 Interim Award in Case No. 6097 of 1989, 4 Int'l Comm. Arb. 76.
87Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92

Id.

93Id.
94

Id
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public qualities are involved in patent validity arbitrability. 95 In fact, even if an
arbitration award refuses to recognize the validity of a patent, this outcome merely
affects the parties involved and is not binding on third parties. 96 Because the
outcome is not binding on third parties, the arbitration has nothing to do with the
public policy. The result of an award that finds a patent invalid merely affects
contractual rights and obligations between the parties of the arbitration. As such,
the power of states to register, grant, and invalidate patents sill remains intact.97
If the state's power remains intact through this type of inter partes resolution,
there is little to suggest that patent validity must be excluded from arbitration. For
example, even in the case of antitrust, an area of law statutorily reserved for the
federal government, courts have allowed parties to settle antitrust disputes through
arbitration. 98 In the case of patent validity, neither statutes nor case law seem to
support the argument that this issue must be excluded from inter partes
arbitration. 99 Instead, courts have indicated that state laws do not preclude
arbitration of patent validity. In Switzerland, two decades ago, the Federal Office of
Intellectual Property stated that arbitral tribunals could decide the validity of
industrial property-patents, trademarks, and designs. 100 These arbitration awards,
accompanied by certificates issued by a Swiss court, are registered in the Federal
Office of Intellectual Property.101
For international arbitration awards, this
certificate will be issued pursuant to Article 193.1 of the Federal Private
International Law statute of 1987.102 Other states, such as India, would seem to
allow arbitrability of patent validity, as demonstrated by their court's inter partes
approach to patent validity generally. Courts in India can judge the validity of a
patent and apply it only to the parties involved in the dispute. 103 In some countries,
parties still can litigate for patent rights based on the validity of the patent at issue
while the court thinks that patent should be invalid. 104 An arbitration panel could do
exactly the same thing. As long as the parties can solve their disputes through
private settlements with the risk that public interests may not be fully represented,
then why are they prohibited from arbitrating patent validity or invalidity?

2. With respect to the erga omnes effect
Even the bold argument that takes the third-party effect into consideration is
more or less convincing. The arguments are introduced below.

95 See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970).

96 E.g., Interim Award in Case No. 6097 of 1989, 4 Int'l Comm. Arb. 76.
97 See Grantham, supra note 81, at 199; Eiland, supra note 3, at 292.
98 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-35 (1985)
(finding that some antitrust claims under the Sherman Act are arbitrable). The Court cites the
Federal Arbitration Act and encourages arbitration when possible. Id. at 626.
9 See id.
100 See Briner, supra note 69, at n.25.
101 Id. at 2.2.2.
10 2 Id
103 M.A. Smith et al., supra note 40, at 313.
104 Id. at 304-05.
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This argument suggests that the relevant interests of the public are both the
state's interests and the private interests of nonparties. The public interest behind
the patent system is to stimulate innovation by protecting the return for the
inventors and investors.1 05 Rather than keeping innovation secret, the patent system
encourages inventors to make their patent innovations public in exchange for a
limited monopoly on the certain invention. 1 06 Then the question becomes whether
there is a balance between the social costs of a patent and the social benefits of that
patent? In other words, can the arbitrability keep such a balance?
The courts have rejected the viewpoint that arbitrators lack the ability to resolve
technical issues. 107 In fact, the freedom to choose competent arbitrators upon specific
disputes can make arbitration a better way to settle such patent validity disputes
than litigation10 8 Therefore, the arbitrators have the capacity to maintain such a
balance. Furthermore, in arbitration, the public interest behind patent validity can
be adequately represented by the parties of a dispute.
In addition, most parties in patent validity disputes are corporations instead of
natural persons, so it is hard to say whether the patentee or the alleged infringer will
be the more powerful party. If one of the parties is a weak consumer, then consumer
arbitration clauses are often invalidated. 109 Thus, powerful parties in an arbitration
process will do their best to approach the truth that can benefit the public. In those
cases, the public interests coincide with the parties' own interests. In some ways, the
public's interests are represented in the arbitration process. For example, an
arbitration award that deems a patent invalid would make the technology publically
available. By making the technology publically available, such an award serves the
public interest. On the other hand, if it is hard and expensive to prove the
invalidity, 110 the result of the arbitration is still in conformity with the current
patent granted by the competent administrational agency representing public
interest. The benefit or status of a third party or the public will not recede even an
inch.

D. My Views
First, the monopoly inherent in the nature of the patent does not necessarily
lead to the denial of arbitrability. The arbitrability of patent validity is not bound to
derogate public policy. The concept of public policy is so abstract that it should be
applied very carefully. We cannot reach a particular conclusion merely based on
abstract and empty theories. In other words, if the effect of an arbitration award
involving patent validity only exists between disputing parties and does not bind a
105See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1989).
106See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 19-20 (1829).
107See, e.g., Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1987).
108Robert H. Smit, General Commentary on the WIPO Arbitration Rules, Recommended
Clauses, General Provisions and the WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules: Articles 1 to 5,; Articles 39
and 40, 9 AMv. REV. INT'L ARB. 3, 5 (1998).
109See M.A. Smith et al., supra note 40, at 311.
110See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
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third party, it will not relate to monopoly or public interests. Thus, the monopoly or
public policy cannot be the pretext to preclude arbitrability. Even though such
arbitration awards would be based on the invalidity of a patent as between the
parties, the patent in question could remain valid as to the public and to the
government authority.111
Similarly, an arbitration award could recognize the
validity of a patent even where the public denies recognition, pursuant to the final
and conclusive judgment of the government authority. In fact, according to due
process principles, if a party does not participate in the arbitration process, he cannot
be bound by the arbitration award absent consent. 1 1 2 In an infringement dispute,
once the respondent argues the validity of the claimant's patent, the arbitrator must
decide whether the claimant actually owns a valid patent. Assuming that the
arbitrator decides the patent is invalid, that patent right is still enforceable in other
disputes because the state has not revoked those rights. 1 1 3 A third party has no right
to share in the victory of the respondent because she has not taken part in the
arbitration. 114 She has not fought with the respondent side by side. Therefore, the
determination of invalidity is only applicable to the parties in the current dispute. In
fact, the enforceability of the arbitration award is only between the parties. 115 The
arbitration does not actually invalidate the patent at issue to the public. Such relief
is granted under some arbitral rules without influencing public policy interests. 116
Sometimes, at the request of the parties, the arbitral tribunal may deal with the case
according to principles of equity and the arbitrator's conscience. 117 This means that
the arbitration tribunal can decide a case not strictly according to laws; and instead,
its decisions can be different from those made by courts or government agencies who
must strictly comply with the laws.
Second, for the sake of international commerce and party autonomy, the public
policy concept should be interpreted narrowly. 118 At least, it should be exercised by
careful thought and restraint because the subject matter involving public policy does
not always lead to the negation of arbitrability. For example, real property is
granted through registration with a public authority. "It has sometimes been
supposed that the entire property in the land vested exclusively in the King [after the
1066 Norman invasion] and that to this day the Crown remains the only true owner
of the land situated within the jurisdiction" in England. 119 In North America, the
colonial land tenure came from the Crown's grant. After the independence of the
United States, the states declared that they owned all the lands formerly owned by
the Crown.1 20 In modern times, it is the state instead of the King who grants and
111See Aeschlimann, supra note 82, at 661-62.

112New York Convention, supra note 33, at art. V(1)(b).
113See M.A. Smith et al., supra note 40, at 304-05.
114
1d. at 311-12
115See id. at 320.
116 See, e.g., id. at 353.

117 See, e.g., UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 43, at art. 33.
118 See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier, 508
F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; A Market
Incentive Solution to Regulating The Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due
Process, and FairPlay in Online Consumer Arbitration, 23 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 60-62 (2002).
119 Grantham, supra note 81, at 182 n.50 (quoting KEVIN GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 52, 55
(2d ed. 1993)).
120 Id. at 183 n.52.
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records those rights in state registries. 1 21 This feature is shared with patents. Real
property is even "more public" because it belongs to the King in tradition. If parties
can settle their disputes related to real estate with arbitration awards, why not settle
patent validity disputes through arbitration? Intellectual property and real property
are similar, and patent validity and real estate are analogous. There is no public
policy problem in an arbitration regarding real property title. After all, if a person
may give up, transfer, or assign his private rights or interests to another person, why
would he not be able to surrender his private rights or interests to the other party by
an arbitration award, whether the rights or interests are based on patent, real estate
or other private property? When he gives up his rights to a specific person, what is
the disadvantage for the public or any third party? Why should he not be able to
enjoy the freedom to surrender his patent rights? The right to surrender is exactly a
part of the right per se. For this reason, the subject matter itself connecting to public
policy is one thing; the arbitration of that subject matter is another.
In summary, if we confine the effect of a patent validity determination to the
parties in the single dispute, it is not necessary to discuss the competence of the
arbitration tribunal to settle patent validity disputes for the public or third parties.
As for parties in the dispute, they voluntarily choose the arbitration tribunal, so
there is no competence problem.

IV. THE PROCEDURAL MATTERS OF PATENT ARBITRATION

A. Documents
The first thing to consider about documents in a patent arbitration is privilege.
Some documents in patent arbitration may be privileged, such as the communication
between a patent agent and a client. It is the client relationship as well as the client
information which must be protected. 1 22 Arbitrators cannot review documents that
are claimed as privileged. If they do, the award of the arbitration is likely to be set
aside. 1 23 CAR rule 31(c) states: "The arbitrator shall take into account applicable
principles of legal privilege, such as those involving the confidentiality of
communications between a lawyer and client." 1 24 For the same reason, there is also a
confidential relationship between patent examiner and client. 1 25
The second thing regarding documents is discovery. Discovery is very expensive
and frequently costs more than one million dollars in the United States. 1 26 Under
121 Id. (citing William R. Vance, The Quest for Tenure in the United States, 33 YALE L. J. 248,
263 (1924)).
122 See Eiland, supra note 3, at 298 n.128 (citing PATRICIA SHAUGHNESSY, ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN, SWEDISH, AND EC LAW 255 (2001)).
2
1 3 1d. (citing LARS HEUMAN, ARBITRATION LAW OF SWEDEN: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 38587 (2003)).
124 CAR RULES, supra note 47, at r. 31(c).
125 See Tom Brody, Duty to Disclose: Dayco Products v. Total Containment, 7 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 369 (2008).
126 Douglas Doskocil, Knowing Your Toolset: How to Use ADR to Your Advantage During
Patent Litigation, 44 IDEA 247, 248-49 (2004).
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the common law system, there is full disclosure of documents. 1 27 Parties and
tribunals may decide to what extent they should disclose. However, in civil law
courts, the discovery is usually limited. 1 28 In arbitration, parties may agree to
certain discovery but the tribunal has only limited power to compel discovery. 1 29 As
to international arbitral institution rules, UNCITRAL Rules, Article 24(3) allows a
tribunal to require the production of documents, exhibits, or other evidence. 1 30 It is
not clear if it is compulsory or not. The ICC Rules Article 20(5) states that during
the proceedings, the tribunal "may summon any party to provide additional
evidence." 1 31 The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
Rules ("SCC Rules") Article 26(3) states that tribunals have authority to order
production of documents or other evidence. 1 32 The LCIA Rules Article 22.1 stipulates
that tribunals can order a party to produce documents or classes of documents. 1 33
The International Bar Association ("IBA") Rules of Evidence states that a tribunal
can request a party to produce documents. 1 34 Such a "request" is not coercive.
However, the tribunal may reach negative inferences if the requested documents are
relevant to the arbitral subject matter. 1 35 Finally, the Patent Arbitration Rules
Article 30 empowers the arbitrators to summon a witness. 136

B. Experts

It is not necessary for selected arbitrators to have a legal background because
the arbitral procedure does not strictly adhere to a government's laws. 1 37 However, a
"battle of experts" may be raised, as both parties in arbitration would like to
introduce their own expert. 138
The technology decision is crucial in patent
arbitration. Therefore, whoever has the power to decide the expert is of importance.

127 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (providing U.S. discovery rules for Federal Courts). E.g.,

id. at 33(a)(1) (allowing parties twenty-five written interrogatories, unless the parties agree to more
or leave of court is granted); id. at 30(a)(2)(i) (requiring leave of the court to take more than ten
depositions).
128 See Eiland, supra note 3, at 299.
129 See generally W. Scott Simpson

& Omer Kesikli, The Contours of Arbitration Discovery, 67
ALA. LAW. 280 (2006) (discussing the varying degrees of limited power that the Federal Arbitration
Act provides to arbitrators to compel discovery).
130 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 36, at art. 24(3).
131 ICC RULES, supra note 46, at art. 20(5).
132 ARBITRATION INST. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES art.
26(3) (2010) [hereinafter SCC RULES], available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/skiljedomsregler4.aspx.
133 LCIA RULES, supra note 52, at art. 22.1.
134 INT'L BAR ASS'N [IBA], IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE

IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, arts. 3.4, 3.5 (2010).
135 Id. at art. 9.4.
136 See CAR RULES, supra note 47, at art. 30.
137 Eiland, supra note 3, at 302 (citing Kenneth B. Clark & William A. Fenwick, Structuring an

ArbitrationAgreement for High Technology Disputes, 9 COMPUTER LAW 22, 24 (1992)).
138 Id. at 302 (citing Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About
Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity", 25 CONN. L.
REV. 1083, 1084-85 (1993)).
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If parties have not agreed on how to choose their experts, the arbitral tribunal
has the power to appoint an expert or experts.139 The CAR Rule Article 30 stipulates
that the parties can produce evidence, including witnesses, to support their claim or
defense, and the witnesses shall be questioned by the arbitrators and the adverse
party. 140 The IDRP Rules Article 22(1) states: "[t]he tribunal may appoint one or
more independent experts to report to it, in writing, on specific issues designated by
the tribunal and communicated to the parties." 1 41 Additionally, Article 22(2) states:
The parties shall provide such an expert with any relevant
information or produce for inspection any relevant documents or
goods that the expert may require. Any dispute between a party and
the expert as to the relevance of the requested information or goods
shall be referred to the tribunal for decision. 142
According to the AAA, patent disputes should be resolved with the Supplementary
Rules along with the CAR. 1 43 The ICC Rules Article 20(3) states that experts are to
be appointed by the parties. 1 44 Article 20(4) states that the tribunal may, after
consulting the parties, appoint one or more experts, define their terms of reference,
and may receive their reports. 1 45 The WIPO Rules Article 48(b) states that either at
the request of a party or via its own motion, the arbitral tribunal may order
documents or other evidence to be made available to the tribunal or to an expert. 146

C. Interim Relief
A patentee has the right to exclude others from using, making, selling, or
importing an invention. 1 47 However, once infringement is found, it is usually hard to
price the damage. 1 48 The best way to protect patentees is to prohibit potential
infringers from using, making, selling, or importing the invention. Therefore,
injunctive measures are necessary in certain circumstances.
However, in some jurisdictions the arbitral institution has no power to order
interim measures. 1 49 In France, arbitrators can grant the same interim measures as

139

Id. at 302-04.

140CAR RULES, supra note 47, at 30(a).
141 IDRP, supra note 50, at art. 22(1).
142 Id. at art. 22(2).
143See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, RESOLUTION OF PATENT DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY RULES

(2006), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=27417.
144 ICC RULES, supra note 46, at art. 20(3).
145 Id. at art. 20(4).
146WIPO RULES, supra note 44, at art. 48(b).
147 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
148See id. §284; Eiand, supra note 3, at 314.
149See Eiand, supra note 3, at 315 (citing John A. Fraser, III, Congress Should Address the
Issue of ProvisionalRemedies for Intellectual Property Disputes Which Are Subject to Arbitration, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 505, 534 (1998)).

[10:384 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

400

judges. 150 The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
Article 17(A)(1)(a) states that the party requesting the interim measure must
establish that "[h]arm not adequately repairable by an award of damages is likely to
result if the measure is not ordered, and such harm substantially outweighs the
harm that is likely to result to the party against whom the measure is directed if the
measure is granted." 15 1 Additionally, under these rules, an arbitral tribunal has the
right to issue grants preliminary-by Article 17(B)-without notice to the other
party. 1 52 Although some jurisdictions have been influenced by the UNCITRAL Model
Laws to provide interim measures, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 153 was not. 154
In practice, most courts will enforce interim measures issued by arbitral tribunals if
the arbitration was derived by an arbitration agreement. 15 5 The ICC Article 23(1)
states, "[u]nless the parties have otherwise agreed, as soon as the file has been
transmitted to it, the Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any
interim or conservatory measure it deems appropriate." 1 56 Furthermore, the ICC
Article 2 states that the arbitrators may "[o]rder any conservatory measures or any
measures of restitution that are urgently necessary to prevent either immediate
damage or irreparable loss and so to safeguard any of the rights or property of one of
the parties." 157 The WIPO Arbitration Rules are specifically designed to satisfy the
demands of intellectual property arbitration detailing the interim measures. 15 8
Article 46(a) states, "[a]t the request of a party, the Tribunal may issue any
provisional orders or take other interim measures it deems necessary, including
injunctions." 1 59 Article 46(d) states that a request of a party for interim measures is
not incompatible with or deemed a waiver of the Arbitration Agreement. 1 60
Additionally, the CAR Rule 33 states that "[t]he arbitrator may issue such orders for
interim relief as may be deemed necessary to safeguard the property that is the
subject matter of the arbitration, to preserve evidence, and/or to protect trade secrets
or other proprietary information that might be disclosed during the arbitration." 1 61
The word "property" presumably includes patents. 1 62 The SCC rules Article 32 states
that the arbitral tribunal may order interim measures at the request of a party. 163
The CAR Rule 34 states that an arbitrator may take necessary interim measures

150Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, Geneva,
Switzerland, Mar. 3-4, 1994, The Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, WIPO Publication
No. 728 (by Julian D.M. Lew).
151UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 36, at art. 17(A)(1)(a).
152 Id. at art. 17(b)(1).
153 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006).
154Eiland, supra note 3, at 316.
155 Id. (citing John A. Fraser, III, Congress Should Address the Issue of Provisional Remedies
for Intellectual Property Disputes Which Are Subject to Arbitration, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
505, 540 (1998)).
156 ICC RULES, supra note 46, at art. 23(1).
157 ICC, RULES FOR A PRE-ARBITRAL REFEREE PROCEDURE, art. 2.1(a) (Jan. 1990), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4427/index.html.
158 Eiland, supra note 3, at 319.
159WIPO RULES, supra note 44, at art. 46.
160 Id.

161CAR RULES, supra note 47, at r. 33.
162 Eiland, supra note 3, at 317.
163 SCC RULES, supra note 132, at art. 32.

See Eiland, supra note 3, at 318-319.
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including injunctive relief. 164 The Supplemental Rules Rule L-3 states the agenda at
the preliminary hearing. 165 The CAR's "Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of
Protection" provides for emergency measures before the constitution of the
tribunal. 166 According to Optional Rule 4, the interim award can be issued once the
party seeking it shows the possibility of immediate and irreparable loss or damage. 167
If a patentee agrees to arbitrate for an infringement dispute, he does not give up
the interim relief in the arbitration unless restricted by the context of the arbitration
agreement. 168

V. ADVANTAGES OF INTERNATIONAL PATENT ARBITRATION

A survey in 2006-2007 compared the most important advantages
international arbitration regarded by practitioners in the west and east: 169
Advantages

East

West

Forum is neutral

88%

78%

Forum has expertise
Results are more predictable
Voluntary compliance

83%
36%
42%

76%
42%
24%

Treaties ensure compliance abroad

85%

69%

Confidentialprocedure

76%

56%

Limited discovery

47%

56%

No appeal

64%

58%

Procedure is less costly

36%

20%

Less time consuming

57%

35%

More amicable

52%

35%

of

As for patent disputes, the advantages of international arbitration are discussed
below.

A. Saving time
Arbitration can be faster than litigation. Patent litigation often lasts for more
than ten years. 170 And because courts often bear a heavy caseload, it may be a long
164CAR RULES, supra note 47, at r. 34.
165CAR RULES, supra note 47, at r. L-3; Eiland, supra note 3, at 317.
166CAR RULES, supra note 47, at r. 0-1; Eiland, supra note 3, at 317.
167CAR RULES, supra note 47, at r. 0-4; Eiland, supra note 3, at 317-18.
168Eiland, supra note 3, at 319 (citing Paul M. Janicke, Maybe We Shouldn't Arbitrate: Some
Aspects of the Risk/Benefit Calculus of Agreeing to Binding Arbitration of PatentDisputes, 39 HOUS.
L. REV. 693, 707 (2002)).
169 Shahla F. Ali, Approaching the Global Arbitration Table: Comparing the Advantages of
Arbitrationas Seen by Practitionersin East Asia and the West, 28 REV. LITIG. 791, 833 tbl.1 (2009).
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Although figures for an "average" time for
wait for an available docket. 171
international patent litigation are difficult to obtain, an average of 1.12 years was
found for each patent suit in the U.S. district courts from 1995-1999.172
Arbitration, on the other hand, is available at any time the parties are ready to
negotiate. Parties do not have to wait for the court to be ready. Once disputing
parties choose summary adjudication, arbitration can be even more expedient. 1 73 As
such, arbitration appears to be a much more time-efficient solution.

B. Saving Costs
While litigation may be slow and expensive, arbitrations can expedite cases and
reduce courts' caseload without sacrificing the fairness of the resolution. 174
International commercial arbitration can be much cheaper than international
lawsuits because arbitration is quicker and has fewer requirements than formal
litigation. 175 The costs spent in litigation such as hiring expert witness, paying for
discovery, and preparing exhibits can be huge, especially in complicated patent
disputes. 176
The parties can save on costs by appointing or electing proper
arbitrators who are specialists in the subject matter at issue. Parties do not have to
educate the judge or jury with the necessary knowledge regarding the patent at
issue. In the United States, the general rates range between $250-400 per hour for
an expert panelist. 177
Cost saving for arbitration is more apparent where there are parallel motions
regarding the same dispute or patent. Several lawsuits are more likely to arise in a
cross-border infringement.
It will cost a lot to conduct lawsuits in multiple
jurisdictions at the same time. A single international arbitration may replace all the
possible lawsuits in order to save costs as well as avoid inconsistent judgment
results. 178
Further, the awards of arbitration are much harder to challenge than a
judgment, therefore the cost of appellate lawyers and expert witnesses can be
saved. 1 79 In general, there is no appeal for an award, which is final and conclusive. 18 0
Eiland, supra note 3, at 284.
Tom Arnold, Fundamentals of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why PreferADR, in PATENT
LITIGATION, 1993, at 670 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook
Ser. No. 376, 1993), available at WL, 376 PLI/Pat 655.
172 Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 908 (2001).
173 Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1096, 1103 (1995).
174 See Grantham, supra note 81, at 179.
175 See Christopher P. Hall & Scott J. Newton, InternationalArbitration Bodies: A Survey,
N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1992, at 6.
176 See Michael H. Diamant et al., Alternatives to Going to Trial Settlement and ADR Methods,
in LITIGATING TRADEMARK, TRADE DRESS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES (ALI-ABA Course of
Study), available at WL, SF75 ALI-ABA 243, 246 (2000).
170

171

177Id.
178 See Eiland, supra note 3, at 286 (discussing the case in the U.K. finding non-infringement of

the "Epilady" razor as compared to the German court that found infringement for the same
"Epilady" razor).
179 Eiland, supra note 3, at 288.

[10:384 2011]

International Arbitration of Patent Disputes

403

C. Confidentiality
Although the degrees of confidentiality in arbitration differ, 181 confidentiality
can be an advantage of international patent arbitration. For example, in English
law, confidentiality is implied even when the parties do not stipulate to a
confidentiality clause in their agreements. 182 According to the rules of the LCIA and
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, parties cannot reveal any facts about
the arbitration, including their participation. 183 Therefore, confidentiality can be a
good reason for the parties to choose arbitration; it is easier in arbitration to keep
secrets out of the press and competitors. 184 In arbitration, it is more likely that
secret information will remain confidential. 185
Specifically in patent validity
disputes, parties are more likely to keep silent to maintain their technology
advances.

D. Predictability
One of the important reasons why parties choose arbitration to resolve their
disputes is that the arbitration is predictable.
The parties may not trust the
application of foreign law, legal practices, political systems, social culture and
economic structures. The arbitration can avoid circumstances in which the courts,
according to its private international law, have to apply foreign law as the applicable
law. In arbitration, parties are allowed to select the applicable law as well as the
seat of arbitration. 186 If the applicable law is likely to be more familiar to the parties,
they are better able to predict the result of the arbitration. Hence, the parties can
avoid the uncertainty of a jury decision and enhance certainty. The determination of
a jury is always uncertain and is frequently a zero-sum game. In contrast, the
arbitration can create a win-win situation.

E. Harmony
Arbitration is usually regarded as a tool to resolve the disputes with minimal
damage to business relationships. 187 Especially in patent disputes, the claimant and
the respondent generally have a business relationship. If they can maintain their
180See New York Convention, supra note 33, at art. V (providing limited methods of appeal).
Errors of law and fact are not included. Id. However, an award can be set aside by court in country
where the arbitration took place, generally for violations of that country's public policy. See id.
181See generally L.Y. Fortier, The Occasionally UnwarrantedAssumption of Confidentiality, 15
ARB. INT'L 131 (1999) (detailing confidentiality in arbitrations).
182See M.A. Smith et al., supra note 40, at 316.
183Id.
See also, e.g., LCIA RULES, supra note 52, at art. 30; SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
CENTRE,
INTERNATIONAL
RULES,
R.
34.6
(1997),
available at
http://www.siac.org.sg/cms/pdf/Rules1997.pdf.
184 See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000).
185

See id.

186

See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).

187 MICHAEL

BUHLER ET AL., PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 9

(Frank-Bernd Weigand ed., 2002).
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relationship the arbitration, they can go on to benefit from each other after the
resolution. 188 In contrast, parties may attack each other in a lawsuit, destroying
future business opportunities without maintaining a friendly business relationship.

F. Flexibility
When parties agree to an arbitration clause, they may choose the arbitration
institution and location as well. 1 89 However, the entire arbitration need not occur at
the seat of the arbitration institution. It depends on where the parties, lawyers,
evidence, documents and witnesses are located.
Furthermore, parties and
arbitrators can choose anywhere to arbitrate.
This opportunity is relatively
convenient and flexible for international patent disputes, particularly in cases in
which multi-national infringement is claimed.

G. Expertise
In civil law jurisdictions, judges in general have no technology background.190
And, under common law systems, such as United States, the juries, who also may
have little technology background, are used to determining the facts.191 Thus, some
patent issues involving complex technology may be too complicated and difficult for
juries. 192 In fact, scholars have found that juries side with patentees more often on
patent validity issues than with judges. 193
In commercial arbitration, the parties are more likely to choose the experts and
the procedures. 1 94 This will allow the parties convenience and flexibility. In patent
cases specifically, experts chosen by the parties to be the arbitrators can judge the
technology issues independently. In such cases, the arbitrators can review the expert
reports instead of following it with blind deference. The arbitrators are likely not to
be the rubber stamp of expert witnesses. In contrast, the jury and even the judge
may be limited by the expert report because they lack the necessary knowledge in
patent law. Compared to a jury, selected arbitrators with technology expertise can
consider the patent issues more precisely and avoid bias.

188See Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, Geneva,
Switzerland, Mar. 3-4, 1994, The Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, WIPO Publication
No. 728 (by Brian Niblett), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/
1994/niblett.html.
189 See Eiland, supra note 3, at 309.
190 See Paul M. Schoenhard, Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real Property Principals to
Guide Federal Circuit Patent Jurisprudence, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 299,
304-05 (2007).
191 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
192 See Eiland, supra note 3, at 287.
193 See id. (quoting evidence from James F. Davis, JudicialManagement of Patent Litigation in
the United States: Observationsfrom the Litigation Bar, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 549, 549-50 (2000)).
194 See Grantham, supra note 81, at 175.
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VI. THE TACTICS FOR A DECISION MAKER TOWARD
INTERNATIONAL PATENT ARBITRATION

A. Is it proper to offer or accept an offer of arbitrationor an arbitrationagreement?
As a decision maker, the first thing to consider in a patent dispute is whether it
is proper to stipulate to an arbitration clause in the commercial contract. Should the
enterprise offer the arbitration clause? When the other side offers an arbitration
clause, should the decision maker accept it? In circumstances where there is no
arbitration clause in the contract, should the party offer or accept the offer to bring
the current dispute to arbitration?
Generally speaking, the decision maker should consider the value or potential
benefit and loss of the patent at issue. If the value or future profit or loss is high
enough and the party's pocket is deep enough, is it worth beating the enemy in court?
The long and lasting front line in litigation is a war of attrition to defeat the foes.
However, the fruits will be nice and sweet. Without any compromise, which could
happen in arbitration, a party can collect a large amount of damages or benefit
greatly from using the patent at issue.
On the contrary, if the value of the patent in question is not high enough, or a
party lacks sufficient resources to fight to the end, it would be better to enter into an
arbitration to settle to protect the future of his enterprise. This is why research has
found that disputes of patents with less value are more likely to be arbitrated. 1 95
When a large amount of money is involved, litigation is always preferred. 1 96 More
precisely speaking, the party with more financial advantages may prefer litigation to
its rivals. 197
However, the imbalance of resources between the parties may not be the most
critical factor. Because an award only affects the parties in the dispute, a loser in
arbitration may not suffer from a total loss in the market. The party who assesses
itself is more likely to lose in litigation and still be willing to enter an arbitration
agreement.
If an injunction is issued by a court holding that the patent in question cannot
be utilized until the final and conclusive judgment is made, the patent becomes
valueless because the litigation period may last longer than the life cycle of the
patent; the efforts of litigation would be in vain. Arbitration would be a better choice
in such a situation because the length of interim relief, if any, would survive the life
of the patent. On the other hand, the choice of arbitration means that the parties
may waive the access to interim relief if the chosen arbitral institution cannot
provide proper interim measures. The parties may try to use arbitration just for
insurance purposes or to demonstrate their patent rights to competitors. 198

195See Eiland, supra note 3, at 284 (citing Vivek Koppikar, Using ADR Effectively in Patent
Infringement Disputes, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 158, 165-66 (2007)).
196

See id.

197 See id. at 287 (citing William Kingston, The Case for Compulsory Arbitration: Empirical
Evidence, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 154, 154-55 (2000)).
198 Id. at 295.
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B. What is the proper arbitrationinstitution and the proper applicable law to choose?
Once the decision is made to resort to arbitration, the parties should be very
careful in choosing the seat of arbitration and the applicable substantial law.
Different arbitration institutions may have different arbitral procedures, which may
be favorable or harmful to a given side. For example, if the key evidence is in one
party's hands and that party does not want such evidence to be available to the other
side, it may choose an arbitral institution without full discovery. 199 If one party
wants to control the selection of experts as arbitrators or witnesses, or it needs
emergent measures to protect its patent, it may choose an arbitral institution with
the procedure more favorable to it. As such, it is necessary to "search and research"
before selecting the arbitration forum.
As to the applicable law, different applicable substantial laws may lead to
different arbitral results. When deciding the proper seat of arbitration and the
applicable law, it is important to consider the problem of recognition and enforcement
of foreign arbitration awards in a specific jurisdiction. 200 Even where the forum and
applicable law are not ideal, they may still be the best choice where the award can be
recognized and enforced in a state in which the opposing party has adequate property
to discharge his obligation under an arbitration award. On the other hand, if the
forum or applicable law appears to favor one side, this choice may not be recognized
by the country in which the party plans to attach or seize property. The reasons
vary. For example, the state where the forum of arbitration is, or the state which is
supposed to enforce a foreign award, may not be a member of 1958 New York
Convention. 201 Besides, the state that is meant to recognize the award may have
special public policy concerns, such as political or religious factors, and refuse to
enforce the arbitral award at issue. 202 The problems of enforceability of foreign
arbitral awards focus on the New York Convention for the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, which has been widely ratified.
The enforcement provisions are stipulated in Article V.203 The New York Convention
requires courts in member states to enforce arbitral awards made by foreign law if,
inter alia, the award was made according to the arbitration agreement and the
arbitral proceeding has met minimal standards of fairness such as proper service, the
award concerns a subject matter with arbitrability, and the award does not violate
principles of public policy in the state in which enforcement is sought. 204 Under the
framework of the New York Convention, the party opposing enforcement has the
burden of establishing that the foreign arbitral award is not enforceable. 205 A
199See John W. Hinchey et al., Presentation at Center for International Legal Studies Salzburg
Conference: Discovery in International Arbitration (June 15-18, 2008) (on file with The John

Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law).
200 New York Convention, supra note 33, at art. I (providing a method of enforcing arbitral
awards).
201 Id. at art. VIII.
202 Id. at art. V.
See also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De
L'Industrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1974) (detailing the narrowness with which
public policy defenses under art. V of the New York Convention should be interpreted).
203 New York Convention, supra note 33, art. V.; see also ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION OF 1958, 291-94 (1981).
204 NeW YOrk Convention, supra note 33, at art. V(1).
205

Parsons, 508 F.2d at 973.
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decision maker should pay more attention to instances where the other party may
provide a public policy defense declaring the arbitration agreement unenforceable.
Such a defense, particularly with patent validity disputes, is likely to be legitimate
and accepted. 206
Another consideration for decision makers is whether the applicable law allows
the arbitrability of patent validity and to what extent its effect reaches. This is
important to understand before selecting the applicable law to be drafted in an
arbitration clause. If the parties have stipulated the applicable substantive law in
their arbitration clause, then the stipulated law determines arbitrability. If not, the
law of the place of arbitration will govern. 207 The WIPO arbitration rules maintain
that the law applicable to the arbitration shall be the law of the place of arbitration,
unless the parties have expressly agreed on the application of another arbitration
law and such agreement is permitted by the law of the place of arbitration.2 08 In
general, the applicable law to arbitrate a patent dispute is the substantive law of the
country that issued the patent in question. 209 This is because the conditions or
requirements of granting a patent are specified by the granting country's laws. For
example, in the United States, the judgments of patentability in a foreign court are
not binding on U.S. courts when patent validity is at issue. 210
In a nutshell, it is crucial to create a plan for selecting the arbitral institution
and applicable law before the patent war begins. A decision maker in an enterprise
is like the supreme commander of a field force who may determine the life or death of
that enterprise. However, no matter how sophisticated a decision maker may be, he
cannot make the tactical decisions alone.
The prediction of the result of an
arbitration or litigation by the possible jurisdictions and possible applicable laws is in
a highly specialized field of law. At a minimum, only lawyers familiar with
international commercial arbitration law, private international law, international
civil procedure law, comparative civil law, and comparative substantial patent law
may have the capacity to complete this great and complex mission.

C. How to choose the proper arbitrator?
The basic factors to consider when selecting proper arbitrators are the fame,
record, experience, expertise, and possible conflicts of interest.
Since a patent
dispute may involve complicated technological and scientific knowledge, the
background of the arbitrator is significant. An excellent arbitrator can find the faults
of an expert report and make the right decision. Sometimes there are hundreds or
even thousands of arbitrators who fulfill the requirements of above-mentioned basic
factors. 21 1 Similar to choosing the right juror in a jury trial, selecting the proper
arbitrator is a deep skill.. The history of a candidate is always important.
206 Kojo Yelpaala, Restraining the Unruly Horse: The Use of Public Policy in Arbitration,
Interstate and InternationalConflict of Laws in California, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 379, 460 (1989).
207 1 BORN, supra note 23, at 180.
208 WIPO RULES, supra note 44, at art. 59(b).
209 See id. at art. 59(a).
210 E.g., Cuno Inc. v. Pall Corp., 729 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
211See, e.g., Members of the Panel of Conciliators and of Arbitrators, INT'L CENTRE FOR THE
SETTLEMENT
OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES
(July 2010),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
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D. Other considerations
Generally speaking, a decision maker in an intellectual property organization
has to utilize a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether arbitration should be used to
resolve patent validity disputes before entering an arbitration agreement. He has to
consider at least the following factors: (1) Who will claim and who will defend? Who
will be the other side of party? Who will be the co-claimant and who will be the codefendant? (2) What is the potential risk? (3) For the potential issues, who is likely
to win in court? (4) How long will the potential litigation last? How disruptive will it
be to the client? (5) What will be the costs and fees to fight in a lawsuit or in
arbitration? (6) How will the other side assess the dispute and all of the abovementioned factors? Will the other side decide that the procedure does not produce
unacceptable risks and is likely to have lower costs? 212

CONCLUSION

The sovereign-grant arguments to challenge the arbitrability of patent validity
are not convincing. There is no ground to distinguish patent arbitration from other
kinds of commercial arbitration. The sovereign-grant arguments are so abstract that
they lack any base of actual practice. The sovereign-grant argument is also nothing
more than smoke and illusions. It argues that only the sovereign itself has the power
to extinguish the rights it rendered. The sovereign-grant arguments forget the fact
that the arbitral effect only exists inter partes; the international tendency is to accept
the arbitrability of patent validity. However, it is clearly not popular if the
arbitration could affect third parties as to a patent's validity. Even where a country
accepts arbitration of a patent's validity, the effect is limited to the parties in the
dispute and does not affect the public. Further, there is no issue of public policy. The
parties of a patent validity dispute merely want to allow neutral arbitrator to
determine their rights and obligations to one another. An arbitration award, based
on the parties' express or implicit promises to conform their conduct to the award,
generates new contractual rights to replace the old rights. 2 13 The parties have the
rights and autonomy to make such decisions themselves without the intervention of a
third person.2 1 4 Through arbitration, the parties hope to simply clarify the legal
relationship between them. Enforcing an arbitration award as to specific parties
does not mean that the holdings of the arbitration need to apply to third parties.
Therefore, the argument suggesting that third parties would be adversely affected by
enforcing arbitration awards that encompass patent validity is against the trend. It
cannot work well.

ICSID/DocumentsMain.jsp (providing a list of qualified investment specialists who can be
conciliators or arbitrators in an ICSID tribunal).
212 See Paul M. Janicke, supra note 168, at 695.
213 Id. at 701 n.42 (citing SIR MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 27 (2d ed. 1989)).
214 See Paul M. Janicke, supra note 168, at 701.
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The public policy provisions in the New York Convention Article V should be
construed very narrowly. 215 The refusal of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
should be based on the fact that the enforcement violates the forum state's most
fundamental values, morality, or justice. 216 If we adopt a broad definition of public
policy, it will deduct the functions of international commercial arbitration and hinder
international commerce. Even if the arbitration of patent validity disputes violates
the public policy of a given state, patent validity could be separated from the rest of
the patent dispute and submit the narrow issue of patent validity to the
governmental body with authority to decide patent validity. Then, the final and
conclusive judgment regarding validity could be used by the arbitral tribunal in
making its final decision.
Patent disputes are special because they usually concern foreign elements and
high-level technology. Hence, international commercial arbitration has become an
important consideration for replacing cross-border patent litigation. In fact, there
are several advantages provided by international commercial arbitration in resolving
patent disputes, including time-savings, cost-savings, confidentiality, predictability,
harmony, flexibility, and expertise, among others.
Possible disadvantages of
arbitration can be mitigated by considering these three factors when drafting the
arbitration clause. If a party requires interim measures, it must make sure that
such measures are available under its choice of arbitral institution. The party must
also ensure that the arbitration award can be enforced in the targeted state.
The tactics in choosing international commercial arbitration for a patent dispute
are highly law-oriented. Deliberate legal research and thoughtful planning based on
that research are necessary. Due to the high value of patents, handling a patent
dispute has become an enduring war in which numerous financial resources, human
capital, and precious time will be invested. The result may be a life or death matter
for an enterprise. Unless a party has confidence in gaining more through litigation,
arbitration can reduce the risks involved and bring more certainty to patent disputes.

215 See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier,
508 F.2d 969, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1974).
216 See id. at 974.

